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INTRODUCTION 
The next time you buy clothing, food, or a video, notice the 
difference between the sticker price and the amount you end up 
paying.  In most areas, this difference, the sales tax, goes to the state, 
although some of the revenue may go to a local government.1  The 
courts ruled long ago that state and local governments have the 
power to levy these taxes in a typical retail situation, where a 
customer buys a good from a store, because the transaction occurred 
within state or local boundaries.2 
Now consider how many times you have purchased an item online 
in the past year.  What if the merchant from whom you purchased the 
good did not own any property in your state?  Did you still pay sales 
tax on that item?  Does a state have authority over an online 
merchant who owns no property in the state, has no employees in the 
state, and has no understanding of the laws of the state?  Can the 
state force the merchant to collect the taxes from you?  As the 
number of online transactions continues to grow,3 this hypothetical 
situation underscores a growing tension between state and federal 
government:  Congress often passes legislation regulating interstate 
transactions, but as more of our transactions are interstate in nature, 
the states have begun to assert their own authority in order to 
preserve income. 
Sales and use taxes, which are levied by forty-five states,4 have long 
been an important source of revenue for state and local governments.  
The rigid structure of these long-standing taxes, however, has been 
                                                          
 1. See generally JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 
§§ 12.01-12.02 (3d ed. 2005) (defining the sales tax and describing the growth of 
local and state sales taxes). 
 2. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (surveying the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of sales and use taxes). 
 3. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing 
importance of online transactions in America). 
 4. See Federation of Tax Administrators, State Sales Tax Rates, 
http://www.taxadmin.org/FTA/rate/sales.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (listing 
the general, prepared food, prescription drug, and non-prescription drug sales tax 
rates for all states and the District of Columbia as of Jan. 1, 2006). 
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strained by the rapid evolution of the online economy.5  As a result, 
the Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”) devised a plan, the 
Streamlined State Sales Tax Project (“STP”),6 to recapture some of 
the revenue that state and local governments might otherwise lose as 
consumer purchases migrate from local retailers to online sellers.  
This plan, approved reciprocally by the states, but not by Congress, 
was designed by state legislators to comply with legal guidelines 
articulated by the Supreme Court.7 
This Comment argues, however, that if a foreign merchant8 
challenges these laws, the STP would be declared unconstitutional 
based on a modern understanding of the Commerce Clause and a 
structural, federalist reasoning.  Part I discusses the evolution of sales 
and use taxes and their importance to state and local governments.  
Part II discusses the rising tension between the structure of sales and 
use taxes and the structure of the American economy.  Part II also 
documents the STP—the states’ recent response to this tension—and 
explains the STP’s legal underpinnings.  Part III analyzes the 
potential legal challenges the STP would face from a foreign 
merchant and concludes that while it is likely constitutional on due 
process grounds, the STP is unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause based on stare decisis and federalist reasoning. 
I. BACKGROUND:  SALES AND USE TAXES EXPLAINED 
A sales tax is a levy by a government entity on commercial 
transactions of tangible personal property; it is a consumption tax.9  
Only state and local governments have imposed sales taxes; there is 
                                                          
 5. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (identifying the challenges states 
face in the changing market). 
 6. This Comment will refer to the project as the Streamlined Tax Project, or 
STP, in an effort to avoid the erroneous implication of the official name that the 
project covers only sales taxes, and not use taxes.  See infra Part I (explaining 
differences between sales and use taxes). 
 7. See infra Part II.B (explaining participating states’ goals in creating the STP, 
including compliance with Supreme Court arguments to simplify taxation). 
 8. Within this Comment, the term “foreign merchant” refers to a domestic 
retailer who sells goods on the Internet, where the goods are delivered through a 
common carrier to a given state, while the merchant has no assets or employees 
within that state.  References to foreign merchants in a historical context are to 
merchants who transacted business through catalog sales.  For the sake of emphasis, 
this Comment may also refer to a foreign merchant as an Internet retailer to 
highlight the technology used in the transactions at issue today.  For simplicity, this 
Comment does not consider the implications of truly foreign merchants—i.e., those 
merchants located, and solely operating, outside of the boundaries of the United 
States. 
 9. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 4.12(2)(c). 
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no national sales tax in the United States.10 Generally, state and local 
governments have exempted certain goods, and usually all types of 
services,11 from taxation for two reasons.  First, state governments 
were concerned that a broader sales tax might be too regressive—the 
lowest income earners bearing the highest percent of the tax relative 
to earnings.12  Second, some argue that taxing only tangible goods 
eases the state’s administrative burden of deciding which transactions 
to tax.13  The states’ approach to consumption taxation has been 
markedly different from that of much of the Western world, which 
has gradually moved to favor the value-added tax (“VAT”).14 
                                                          
 10. See Gerald E. Auten & Eric J. Toder, Federal Consumption Tax Proposals and the 
States, in THE SALES TAX IN THE 21ST CENTURY 52, 53 (Matthew M. Murray & William F. 
Fox eds., 1997) (explaining that the federal tax structure focuses “primarily on the 
taxation of income, which can be thought of as the sum of consumption and 
saving”). The federal government does, however, levy excise taxes on designated 
goods, often with the policy goal of decreasing the use of those goods.  See Babak A. 
Rastgoufard, Too Much Smoke and Not Enough Mirrors:  The Case Against Excise Taxes and 
for Gasoline Taxes, 36 URB. LAW. 411, 417-20 (2004) (noting that while they have 
waned in importance, federal excise taxes comprised over three percent of federal 
revenues in 2000, and that excise taxes have become an increasingly important 
component of state income).  See generally Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical 
Perspective, in TAXING CHOICE:  THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 
50-52 (William F. Shughart III ed., 1997) (chronicling the advent of excise taxes on 
seven types of products and services, including cars, firearms, and toxic chemicals). 
 11. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION:  STATE AND LOCAL 
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 89-90 (2d ed. 1995) (noting exceptional states, such 
as Hawaii, New Mexico, and South Dakota, that tax most general services).  
 12. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Treasury, Fact Sheet:  State and Local Taxes, 
http://www.treasury.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/state-local.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2006) (labeling the state retail sales tax “a regressive tax” that “can pose 
problems”); Press Release, Tx. State Rep. Garnet Coleman, Coleman Warns Against 
Raising Regressive Sales Tax (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.house.state.tx.us/news/ 
release.php?id=804 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (cautioning that a hike in the state 
sales tax rate would unduly harm the state’s poorest residents).  But see DUE & 
MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 9-12 (cautioning that while several studies note the direct, 
inverse relationship between income level and the portion of income spent on sales 
taxes, this disparity may be exaggerated because of the relationship between sales 
taxes and the costs of factor production, the indexing of Social Security and welfare 
payments, and the lifetime income theory); Kenneth Trager & H. Frank Williams, A 
Treatment of Intermediate Transactions and Supply Elasticities in the Incidence of Sales Tax, 
in THE SALES TAX IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at 204, 215 (finding through 
regression analysis of data obtained in Florida that previous empirical findings 
purporting regressive consequences of sales and use taxes “can be explained largely 
by the [researchers’] various shifting assumptions” of the price elasticity of goods, 
rather than attributed to the tax scheme itself). 
 13. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 75 (adding that, aside from equity 
concerns, states may elect not to tax purchases on select tangible goods or services 
“to avoid collection problems” or merely because of successful lobbying efforts that 
“reflect the political strength of particular [trade] groups”); cf. id. at 91 (admitting 
that the primary reason that state and local governments have typically not taxed 
services is that “it is virtually impossible to delineate services that are production 
inputs from those that are consumption purchases.”  
 14. See generally LAIM EBRILL, MICHAEL KEEN, JEAN-PAUL BODIN & VICTORIA 
SUMMERS, THE MODERN VAT 1-4 (2001) (explaining that a VAT, intended to replace 
consumption taxes such as a sales tax, is a levy that occurs at each stage of a good’s 
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States began assessing sales taxes during the Great Depression.15  
Mississippi was the first state to impose a retail sales tax, in 1932, and 
many others soon followed.16  Local governments also began 
imposing sales taxes, beginning with New York City in 1934.17  In 
1940, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state 
sales tax, as assessed on typical retail sales within the state.18  The 
Supreme Court later concluded that states could levy a sales tax on 
interstate transactions when the transaction itself involved a 
significant physical presence in the taxing state, even when the 
transaction also involved some physical presence in other states.19 
It soon became apparent that states could not levy a sales tax on 
merchants who did not have a significant presence within the state, 
nor on transactions that occurred fully outside the state, even if the 
consumer subsequently brought the good into the state.20  To create 
revenue in the face of such obstacles, states with sales taxes began to 
employ a companion tax, known as the use tax, levied on the same 
                                                          
production process and “provi[des] for tax payable to be reduced by the tax paid [by 
the producer] in respect of purchases”); id. at 25-39 (concluding that empirical 
evidence of the VAT’s supposed efficiency, in terms of raising government revenue 
and minimizing private economic distortions, has not fully confirmed economic 
theory, in part because data available for analysis is necessarily cross-sectional, rather 
than panel data); RICHARD W. LINDHOLM, VALUE-ADDED TAX AND OTHER TAX REFORMS 
27-57 (1976) (describing the VAT system used in Europe, though it was originally 
conceived in the United States, and the minimal economic distortion the VAT causes 
in consumer habits and well-being). 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 89-565, at 608 (1965). 
 16. William F. Fox, Importance of the Sales Tax in the 21st Century, in THE SALES TAX 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at 1, 1; see DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 3 
(listing the effective year in which each state instituted a sales tax, and whether that 
tax was ever allowed to expire). 
 17. Fox, supra note 16, at 1. Local taxation issues are mentioned here merely to 
flag their importance.  For simplicity, this Comment concentrates on the legal 
framework for state sales and use taxation under the STP and does not conduct a 
separate analysis of the authority of local sales and use taxation. 
 18. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1940) (rejecting a Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to a Kentucky bank deposit tax because the use of banks was 
not considered “a privilege of national citizenship” and noting that so long as state 
policies remained otherwise constitutional, “the power of the state over taxation is 
plenary”); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 (1940) 
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187 (1824)) (arguing that states operate 
within their constitutional powers so long as they do not impose a tax that interferes 
with commerce between multiple states or nations). 
 19. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278-80, 288-89 (1977) 
(rejecting the contention of a carrier that shipped vehicles to Mississippi for  retail 
sale that Mississippi could not levy a sales tax on this transaction because state 
taxation on the “privilege of doing business” in a state as part of an interstate 
transaction was a per se violation of the Commerce Clause). 
 20. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 328-30 (1944) (articulating the 
distinction between a sales tax, which restricts the freedom to purchase, and a use 
tax, which is levied upon the free use of an item, and explaining that while use taxes 
may be constitutional, they are not legally interchangeable with sales taxes, despite 
similar revenue-generating results). 
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types of tangible goods covered by sales taxes.21  States have typically 
levied a use tax when the state could not tax the purchase itself, and 
have generally set the use tax at the same rate as their sales tax.22  
Under a use tax, the state taxes the citizen’s use of the good, not its 
actual purchase, since the state only has clear authority over the 
citizen, not the foreign merchant.  The use tax was meant to cover a 
gap in sales taxation, so a consumer is generally allowed to deduct 
from his use tax liability any sales tax that he paid to another state at 
the time of purchase.23  Thus, the intended effect of the companion 
use and sales taxes was to assure that state residents paid at least the 
same total tax for a good, whether it was purchased in state or out of 
state.24  Whether the tax was collected from the citizen or the 
merchant, it was the citizen’s consumption of goods that funded the 
state coffers.  
Courts have held that use taxes are within the states’ power.25  
Indeed, the Supreme Court found that by instituting an equivalent 
use tax on tangible goods, a state effectively imposed a uniform tax 
burden on its citizens’ consumption, regardless of where they bought 
an item.26  While states possessed the power to tax the use or 
consumption of goods purchased out of state by residents, 
implementation of this power remained difficult.27  Monitoring the 
purchase of all products by residents of a state was, and is, nearly 
impossible, and many residents today are not even aware of their use 
                                                          
 21. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 16.01. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. § 16.01(2) (explaining the history of sales tax and suggesting that this gap 
caused states to fear a loss of local merchants’ business as well as a loss of revenue for 
the state). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940) (decreeing that states 
maintain “the sovereignty to manage their own affairs except only as the 
requirements of the Constitution otherwise provide”). 
 26. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 66 (1963) 
(citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)) (claiming that the 
controversy over use taxes was no longer whether a state may implement them, but 
whether it implements them in a manner that provides complete uniformity of 
consumption taxes within the state). 
 27. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GDC/OCE-00-165, SALES 
TAXES: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE 
UNCERTAIN 19-21 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/g600165.pdf# 
search=%22%22sales%20taxes%3A%20electronic%20commerce%20growth%20pres
ents%20challenges%22%22 (conceding that, depending on assumptions, estimates 
of state losses in revenue due to an inability to collect use taxes from interstate 
Internet sales in 2003 varied between $2.5 billion and $20.4 billion); MICH. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, FACTS ON INTERNET AND MAIL ORDER PURCHASES, http://www.michigan. 
gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1750_2143-5931—,00.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) 
(estimating that consumers neglecting to inform Michigan of remote purchases, and 
not paying the appropriate use tax, would cost the Michigan government $349 
million in fiscal year 2005, affecting both educational and general funding). 
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tax obligations.  Not surprisingly, then, use taxes yield much less 
revenue for states than sales taxes because collecting funds from 
consumers is much more difficult than from merchants. 
Over time, enforcing sales and use taxes has increased in political 
importance because state revenue has, in large part, become 
dependant on these taxes.28  As America’s consumption habits 
change, states will face a number of challenges in order to continue 
extracting the same, or higher, revenue.  For example, in 1970, U.S. 
consumers spent $357 billion on goods and $291.5 billion on services, 
a ratio of 1.22.29  In 2005, consumers spent $3,590.9 billion on goods 
and $5,154.9 billion on services, a ratio of 0.70.30  Because states 
generally tax only tangible goods, consumer substitution of services 
for goods has eroded the tax base for state sales and use taxes.31 
In addition, American consumers have continually changed their 
methods of purchasing goods.  Online retail sales have become a 
significant part of the American economy, projected to grow by more 
than twenty percent from 2005 to 2006.32  In fact, recent research by 
the Department of Commerce indicates that local economies in 
communities where Internet access has been broadly available grew 
more rapidly between 1998 and 2002 than those of typical American 
communities.33   Internet sales are more likely than traditional retail 
                                                          
 28. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 16, at 2 (showing that, according to the Bureau of the 
Census, the share of state revenues derived from general sales and gross receipt taxes 
rose from 24.9% in 1962 to 33.0% in 1994); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS:  2005, http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/0500 
usstax.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (showing that general sales and gross receipts 
taxes comprised 32.8% of all taxes collected by the states). 
 29. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, TABLE 2.3.5:  
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR TYPE OF PRODUCT, http://www.bea. 
gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=65&FirstYear=1970&LastYear=2
005&Freq=Ann (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).  Figures are in 1970 dollars and include 
both durable and non-durable goods. 
 30. Id.  Figures are in 2005 dollars and include both durable and non-durable 
goods. 
 31. See Fox, supra note 16, at 3-4, 7 & Table 1.4 (showing the decline in the share 
of consumption of goods versus services from 1979 to 1995, and discussing the 
resulting loss in expected revenue for states). 
 32. Enid Burns, Online Retail Revenues to Reach $200 Billion, CLICKZ, June 5, 2005, 
http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3611181 (last visited Nov. 8, 2006) 
(summarizing a report conducted by Shop.org that projected total Internet retail 
sales of $211 billion in 2006, and that thirty-eight percent of online consumers will be 
first-time buyers). 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MEASURING BROADBAND’S ECONOMIC IMPACT 4 
(2006), http://www.eda.gov/ImageCache/EDAPublic/documents/pdfdocs2006/ 
mitcmubbimpactreport_2epdf/v1/mitcmubbimpactreport.pdf  (concluding that, 
since the end of 1999, communities with widespread broadband Internet access 
experienced more rapid growth in employment, business incorporations, and 
technology-oriented firms than communities without such access, yet finding no 
significant difference between these communities with respect to changes in average 
wages). 
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sales to involve a resident buying goods from an out-of-state citizen or 
business.  Since Internet-based transactions will incur nearly 
unenforceable use tax liability, rather than sales tax liability, states 
again face dim prospects for revenue growth.  
The prospect of a changing economy that conflicts with static laws 
governing state power is not a new problem.  For example, in the 
early twentieth century, the advent of large corporations and 
interstate travel presented serious issues to the Due Process 
framework originally articulated by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. 
Neff,34 which indicated that citizens could not seek relief in state 
courts without showing that the state met the rigid requirements of 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.35  By 1945, the Court 
confronted this tension by altering the requirements of personal 
jurisdiction.36  Similarly, states formerly could not require merchants 
to collect taxes on sales that physically take place out of state unless 
that merchant owned property within the state,37 though the Court 
has gradually migrated towards a similar contacts analysis.38  
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF SALES AND USE TAXATION 
A. The Foundations of State Taxation of Out-of-State Sales 
In 1967, the Supreme Court explained in National Bellas Hess v. 
Illinois Department of Revenue that while states were not strictly limited 
by territorial bounds to enforce taxation, state power was limited by 
two constitutional clauses39—the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment40 and the Commerce Clause.41  Just as 
                                                          
 34. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 35. Id. at 723-24 (“If the non-resident of a state has no property in the [s]tate, 
there is nothing upon which the [state’s] tribunals can adjudicate.”). 
 36. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945) (concluding 
that justice required that a company need merely decide to conduct business in a 
state in order to be subject to a state’s judicial system because the privilege of doing 
business within a state also carries with it legal obligations).  See generally Wendy 
Collins Purdue, The Story of Shaffer:  Allocating Jurisdictional Authority Among the States, 
in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 129-34 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (describing 
the erosion of strict territorial personal jurisdictional requirements in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence). 
 37. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756, 759 (1967) 
(suggesting that state taxation of foreign corporations presented both Due Process 
and Commerce Clause concerns). 
38.  See infra notes 57–65 and accompanying text (noting that by 1992, the Court 
no longer deemed a strict physical presence rule fair in light of a more national 
economy). 
 39. Id. at 756. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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retailers within the state were obligated to comport with state tax 
policy, the Court explained, foreign merchants, such as mail-order 
retailers, were required to comply with state taxation laws unless these 
statutes overstepped either of two related tests.42  First, a state can 
force a foreign merchant to remit sales or use taxes under the Due 
Process Clause if “the state has given anything [to the foreign 
merchant] for which it can ask return.”43  Second, a state can force a 
foreign merchant to remit sales or use taxes under the Commerce 
Clause only when the tax is “justified as designed to make such 
commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose 
protection it enjoys.”44 
The Court concluded that for National Bellas Hess, an out-of-state 
mail-order company that did not engage in local advertising and 
conducted all transactions via a common carrier (such as the U.S. 
Postal Service), it was “difficult to conceive of commercial 
transactions more exclusively interstate in character.”45  These 
interstate transactions conducted solely via a common carrier lacked 
a sufficient “nexus” with the state—“some definite link, some 
minimum connection, between a state and the [entity] or transaction 
[the state] seeks to tax”—such as a merchant’s physical presence 
within the taxing state.46  Therefore, foreign merchants were not 
obligated to remit use taxes.47  The Court noted one additional, 
practical concern:  a merchant’s mere interaction with an in-state 
                                                          
 42. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (acknowledging that the claims that the state 
use tax law violated the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause were “closely 
related”). 
 43. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940)).  The Court’s 
due process analysis is essentially an inquiry into the balance of forcing a foreign 
citizen to comply with a state law and providing justice for the party asking for 
enforcement—in this case, the state.  See infra Part III.A (outlining due process 
jurisprudence and applying it to the STP). 
 44. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 
253 (1946)). 
 45. Id. at 759. 
 46. Id. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 
(1954)); see, e.g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 362, 364 (1941) 
(ruling that Iowa could tax interstate sales destined for that state because the 
merchant owned retail outlets within Iowa, even though the Iowa retail outlets were 
not involved in the taxed transactions); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 
U.S. 62, 64-66 (1939) (finding that the presence of two salesmen who solicited orders 
and stored and distributed merchandise in California constituted a physical presence 
of the Illinois firm within California, subjecting the transactions to California tax 
law). 
 47. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (explaining that a state cannot legally impose 
use taxes upon a merchant “whose only connection with . . . the [s]tate is by common 
carrier or [the] mail”). 
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customer could not constitute a substantial nexus.48  Otherwise, a firm 
of almost any size would quickly be forced to comply with tax statutes 
from “every other political subdivision throughout the nation with 
power to impose sales and use taxes.”49  There were already 2,300 
jurisdictions imposing such taxes in 1967.50  By virtue of its sheer 
complexity, the Court reasoned, the local taxation system, as applied 
to purely interstate transactions, was contrary to “[t]he very purpose 
of the Commerce Clause.”51 
While the Court in National Bellas Hess suggested that without a 
merchant’s physical presence within a state it would be difficult to 
justify burdening a foreign merchant with compliance with local 
taxation rules,52 the justification for that pronouncement has 
gradually come under pressure.  First, interstate transactions 
conducted through a common carrier have continued to grow in 
importance to the economy.  By 1990, fifty-four percent of Americans 
had made a mail-order purchase in the previous year, and mail-order 
purchases accounted for fifteen percent of retail sales.53  Second, the 
Court continued to adjust due process jurisprudence to comport with 
the changing economy and the resulting disputes.  The Court 
allowed more tenuous contacts between a party and a given forum to 
serve as a sufficient basis on which to establish jurisdiction, so long as 
the contacts were voluntary.54  Third, in 1977, the Supreme Court 
rejected previous case law that had supported the rule that a state 
could not directly tax transactions that were defined as interstate 
                                                          
 48. See id. (citing Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45) (noting that a seller’s 
newspaper and radio advertisement in a state where it has no retail outlets had not 
previously constituted a sufficient nexus for imposition of a use tax). 
 49. Id. at 759. 
 50. Id. at 759 n.12 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-565 (1965)).  A more recent estimate 
pegs that figure at 7,500 jurisdictions that levy a retail tax.  See Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement:  States’ Efforts to Facilitate Sales Tax Collection From Remote Vendors:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 27 (2003) (statement of George S. Isaacson, Tax Counsel, 
Direct Marketing Association) (contending that the sheer number of new laws with 
which firms would be forced to comply under the STP outweighs any potential 
simplification of tax rates or collection mechanisms). 
 51. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760. 
 52. See id. at 756-57 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)) 
(identifying the sole justification for state taxation of interstate commerce as the “fair 
share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys,” and listing 
several instances where the Court has upheld taxation of a foreign merchant, all of 
which include some physical presence in the state). 
 53. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W. 2d 203, 209, rev’d, 504 U.S. 306 (1992) 
(citing TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 63; DIRECT MARKETING, July 1990, at 30).  
 54. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (decreeing that 
a business that purposefully avails itself of the benefits of the taxing state has 
subjected itself to the state’s legal authority). 
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commerce.55  Instead, the Court applied a four-part test to assess the 
validity of a state tax on an interstate transaction.56  
In 1992, the Supreme Court addressed these mounting tensions in 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.57  While the Court acknowledged the 
growing importance of interstate transactions to the national 
economy,58 the majority was more concerned with enunciating a finer 
distinction between the dual limitations on state power—the 
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.59 
The Quill Court noted that a due process analysis was 
fundamentally concerned with “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice” for the foreign merchants, as portrayed in 
International Shoe v. Washington,60 not the physical realities of the 
merchants’ business.61  In particular, the Court in Quill, in contrast to 
National Bellas Hess, applied the similar principles of personal 
jurisdiction and found that a firm was subject to the taxes of a state if 
it “purposefully directed” its activities to the forum in question.62  The 
inquiry, the Court insinuated, was no longer merely a factual 
investigation into whether the firm in question owned a particular 
asset,63 but whether the relationship between the firm and the state 
was a reasonable basis on which to enforce the law.64  Specifically, the 
Court ruled that when a firm intentionally sent mailings to state 
                                                          
 55. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
(emphasizing that the parties stipulated that the merchant had engaged in 
significant activities within Mississippi, and that the only issue was whether the 
interstate nature of the transaction barred state authority); see also supra note 19 
(discussing the previous cases that the Court rejected in Complete Auto). 
 56. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (ruling that state taxation is valid when the “tax 
[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly 
apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly 
related to the services provided by the state”) (emphasis added). 
 57. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 58. See id. at 303-04, 314 (agreeing with the North Dakota Supreme Court that 
far-reaching changes in the national economy and the evolution of cases rendered 
the Nat’l Bellas Hess holding obsolete). 
 59. See id. at 305 (stressing that “[t]he two constitutional requirements differ 
fundamentally, in several ways” and are “analytically distinct”) (emphasis added); see 
also Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recommending that judges approach 
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause issues separately), cited in Quill, 504 U.S. 
at 305. 
 60. Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 61. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 62. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 
(1985)). 
 63. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (applying the “notions of fair 
play and substantial justice” standard to jurisdiction over physical assets). 
 64. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (favoring the flexible contacts inquiry over the more 
formalistic physical presence test). 
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residents, it subjected itself to personal jurisdiction, and therefore 
was also subject to that state’s use tax under the Due Process Clause.65 
The Quill Court noted that, in contrast to the Due Process Clause, 
the Commerce Clause does not explicitly prohibit state action in the 
absence of congressional action.66  While outlining the history of the 
Commerce Clause’s negative power,67 the Court affirmed its narrow 
contemporary use of the doctrine.68  That restricted approach 
prohibited states from imposing taxes only when the statute violated 
one of the four prongs of the test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady.69  Indeed, the first prong of Complete Auto, that the tax must be 
applied to “an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state,”70 
aptly described the reasoning of National Bellas Hess—that a 
merchant’s physical presence in the taxing state is the strongest 
indication of this nexus.71  The Court cited supporting cases in which 
firms lacked a physical presence in the taxing state and the Court 
found that their minor contacts with the forum were insufficient to 
form a nexus under the Commerce Clause.72  The Quill Court 
                                                          
 65. Id. at 308; cf. Adventure Commc’ns., Inc. v. Ky. Registry of Election Fin., 191 
F.3d 429, 435 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying a minimum contacts analysis to conclude that 
a Kentucky statute regulating West Virginia firms was within Kentucky’s legislative 
jurisdiction). But see Quill, 504 U.S. at 319-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(flagging the distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction, 
which are not identical, but have not fully been defined); cf. Gerling Global 
Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) (declaring that 
under a legislative Due Process analysis, a state cannot enforce its laws “beyond its 
borders so as to destroy or impair the right of citizens of other states to make a 
contract not operative within its jurisdiction, and lawful where made”).   
 66. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309. 
 67. See infra Part III.B (explaining the strict dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
and detailing the Court’s use of it). 
 68. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-11 (explaining the Court’s decisions in prior cases such 
as Bellas Hess and Complete Auto and concluding that these cases are not inconsistent 
with its modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 69. Id. (citing P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 
§§ 2:9-2:17 (1981)); see also supra note 56 (defining the four prongs of the Complete 
Auto test); infra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the Complete Auto Court intended to end 
lower courts’ confusion over how to adjudicate disputes concerning state taxation 
power under the Commerce Clause). 
 70. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. 
 71. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977), which distinguished “between mail-order 
sellers with [a physical presence in the taxing] State and those . . . who do no more 
than communicate with customers in the State . . . by common carrier”); see Nat’l 
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 754, 758 (1967) (reaffirming the 
distinction between merchants who are physically present in the taxing state and 
those who are not). 
 72. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.  Compare Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) 
(finding that the route of an interstate telephone call, by itself, did not provide a 
substantial nexus for the state to tax that call), and Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-59 
(holding that the “receipt of mail [in the state, by itself,] provides insufficient nexus” 
for taxation), with D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988) 
EVANS.OFFTOPRINTER 1/9/2007  1:12:23 PM 
2006 SEPARATE BUT TAXED 433 
cautioned, however, that the “slightest” physical presence of a firm in 
the taxing state did not constitute a substantial nexus.73 
The Court’s explanation of what exactly constitutes a substantial 
nexus with a state has not been fully explored.74  Some commentators 
contend that the Court’s intention in Quill was to create a bright-line 
rule whereby a firm with any real physical presence within a state 
qualified as taxable under a state’s ability to regulate transactions 
without violating the Commerce Clause.75  Others see the Quill rule as 
more flexible, in which individual courts may determine the level of 
physical presence in a state needed to qualify as a substantial nexus.76 
B. The States Devise the Streamlined Sales Tax Project to Preserve Revenue in 
the Internet Age 
Amidst the continuing uncertainty over the extent of state taxation 
authority, common-carrier interstate transactions have gained 
importance to the national economy.77  In particular, so-called e-
commerce transactions, purchases made via the Internet,78 have 
                                                          
(concluding that a merchant had sufficient contacts with Louisiana where the firm 
both sent catalogs to Louisiana residents and maintained thirteen retail locations 
there), and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) 
(upholding a Montana tax on the portion of coal extracted by a firm from within the 
state, because the physical presence of the good satisfied the criteria of substantial 
nexus). 
 73. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8 (declaring that the presence of “a few floppy 
diskettes” in North Dakota did not constitute a substantial nexus). 
 74. See Jaime Klima, Mom & Pop v. Dot-Com:  A Disparity in Taxation Based on How 
You Shop?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0028, 4-5 (2002) (contending that online 
retailers are unsure when their businesses have satisfied a definition of “substantial 
nexus”). 
 75. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 560 (rejecting the argument that a firm 
with a physical presence within a state that is wholly unrelated to the transaction at 
issue should not qualify as a substantial nexus with the state); H. Beau Baez III, The 
Rush to the Goblin Market:  The Blurring of Quill’s Two Nexus Tests, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
581, 595 (2006) (positing that “the Quill Court . . . created a simple bright-line test 
measured by physical presence in a state”). 
 76. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 555-56 (implying, through the term 
“sufficient nexus,” that a slight physical presence in a state was not sufficient under 
the Commerce Clause); Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 
1996) (using several factors to determine whether a substantial nexus existed); 
Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1996) (including 
considerations of fairness to the merchant). 
 77. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, E-STATS:  2004, 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/papers/2004/2004reportfinal.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2006) (showing that while total domestic shipment revenues rose 
7.6% from 2003 to 2004, shipments sent through e-commerce orders rose 14.4% 
over the same time period). 
 78. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, E-STATS:  FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/faq.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2006) (defining e-commerce as “the value of goods and services sold . . . [via] use of 
the internet, intranet, extranet, as well as proprietary networks that run systems such 
as Electronic Data Interchange”). 
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become commonplace.79  As the number of purchases with 
ambiguous tax liability continues to grow, the states have become 
increasingly concerned that their revenues may decrease.80  Some 
firms have reacted to their understanding of the Court’s taxation 
rules by legally bifurcating online operations from physical stores in 
an attempt to avoid a substantial nexus with taxing states.81  On the 
other hand, those firms with a significant physical and online 
presence have attempted to cooperate with state taxing authorities in 
an effort to reduce legal costs.82 
The potential loss of revenue from non-taxed online sales, 
however, did prompt states to join in a coordinated effort that they 
dubbed the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (“STP”).83  The STP, 
organized and executed by the Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”), 
a policy and lobbying group of the collective states,84 is an attempt to 
maintain the states’ revenue base in the midst of a changing 
economy.85  Member states appear concerned not only over the 
                                                          
 79. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, E-STATS:  2004, supra note 77, at 2 (documenting 
$130 billion in 2004 consumer Internet purchases, the type of transaction that has 
replaced catalog sales); CARRIE JOHNSON, THE GROWTH OF MULTICHANNEL RETAILING 4 
(July 2004), available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/0407MULTICHANNEL.PDF 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (estimating, based on data through 2003, that 2007 
consumer Internet purchases will reach $204 billion). 
 80. See DONALD BRUCE & WILLIAM F. FOX, STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX REVENUE 
LOSSES FROM E-COMMERCE:  ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2004 (DRAFT) 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0407ecommerce.PDF (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) 
(estimating that state and local governments had already lost between $15.5 billion 
and $16.1 billion due to untaxed Internet sales in 2003). 
 81. The New Rules Project:  Internet Sales Tax Fairness, http://www.newrules. 
org /retail/inttax2.html, (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (highlighting the practice known 
as “entity isolation”).  States have reacted in mixed ways to this legal strategy.  See id. 
(finding that by 2005, six states had enacted legislation rejecting entity isolation as a 
valid means of avoiding state tax collection, while courts in three other states upheld 
entity isolation). 
 82. See Brian Krebs, States Move Forward on Internet Sales Tax, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July 1, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101475.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) 
(reporting that a suit brought by Illinois against several major retailers resulted in 
settlement, rather than protracted litigation).  
 83. See STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX 
PROJECT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2005), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax 
.org/execsum0105.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) (claiming that the project is an 
effort to “simplify and modernize sales and use tax collection”). 
 84. See About the Multistate Tax Commission, http://www.mtc.gov/About 
.aspx?id=40 (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (outlining the composition and goals of the 
MTC). 
 85. See MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK, 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Resources/Studie
s_and_Reports/Federalism_at_Risk/FedatRisk--FINALREPORT.pdf (last visited Oct. 
30, 2006) (emphasizing that the MTC hopes that the STP “make[s] it easier for 
retailers, including remote sellers, to collect . . . tax[es],” though also admitting the 
collective states’ concern over the increasing “ineffectiveness of state sales and use 
taxes” to collect revenues served as additional motivation to enact the STP). 
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possibly limited power to tax Internet commerce specifically, but also 
that, more broadly, the interstate nature of the economy will 
continually erode state authority.86  The MTC has specifically cited 
federalist tensions with respect to recent congressional acts.87  For 
example, a federal law enacted in 2000 prohibits a state from 
imposing corporate taxes on a firm that maintains no physical 
presence within that state.88  Additionally, Congress has twice passed 
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which forbids a state from imposing 
most taxes on Internet access service, among other prohibitions.89  
This Act, while directly relevant to the STP, does not specifically 
outlaw the collection of sales or use taxes, nor did federal legislators 
or other officials intend to undercut this state revenue source.90   
Currently, forty-four states have agreed to participate in the STP.91  
These participating states have simplified their extraterritorial 
taxation laws as part of passing the STP’s Uniform Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement.92  The simplification of taxation is a direct response to 
the complexity of compliance arguments advanced by the Supreme 
                                                          
 86. See id. at 3 (asserting that “[t]he authority to tax is a key element of state 
sovereignty” as outlined by the Constitution). 
 87. See id. at 27-31 (discussing both taxation and non-taxation federalist concerns 
shared by the states). 
 88. See Interstate Income Tax Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391 (2000) (limiting the 
states’ ability to levy income taxes on the proceeds from sales collected by individuals, 
or businesses, who had no physical presence in the taxing state, but who ship orders 
to the taxing state). But cf. Tax Comm’r of W.Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. 04-AA-157, 
2006 WL 3455005 (W. Va. 2006) (concluding that the Quill decision applied only to 
state authority to levy sales and use taxes). 
 89. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)(Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax 
Freedom Act, §§ 1101-1104) (prohibiting states from levying taxes on Internet access 
services, collecting Internet-only taxes, such as taxes on emails or bandwidth, and 
instituting multiple taxation of e-commerce).  This law expires on November 1, 2007.  
See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101(a) (extending the expiration of the act by four 
additional years). 
 90. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101(a)-(b) (prohibiting taxes on internet access 
but otherwise preserving the states’ authority to impose taxes); see U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 4 (July 1, 1997), 
http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewk.wpd (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) 
(declaring that the United States believes that “no new taxes should be imposed on 
Internet commerce”) (emphasis added).  See generally Brian Fagan, Note, Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce:  Avoiding an Inroad upon Federalism, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 465, 470-74 
(2001) (examining the overlapping introduction and passage of the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act and the discussion of goals for Internet taxation published by the 
Clinton Administration). 
 91. Press Release, The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Sales Tax Simplification 
Agreement Becomes Effective Today and Launches Key Element:  Amnesty Program 
(Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/press_rel/Press%20 
Release%20Inaugural%20Gov%20Board%20-%20Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 
2006). 
 92. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX 
PROJECT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 83, at 1-2. 
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Court in both National Bellas Hess and Quill,93 instituting a simpler 
taxation structure to which all participating states assent.94  In 
particular, under the STP, merchants must choose to use one of 
three software programs that calculate the correct tax rate to charge 
the customer without any individual effort by the merchant.95 
The states participating in the STP have agreed to five basic rules 
to determine the “source” of the sale for sales or use tax purposes.  
First, if the customer physically picks up the item from the merchant, 
that location is used for taxation purposes.96  Second, if the customer 
does not pick up the product, and the merchant knows the 
destination of the product, then the destination state is designated 
the “source” state.97  If neither of the above methods yields a “source” 
state, then the merchant may use any known location of the customer 
from the merchant’s business records to designate a “source” state.98  
If none of the above options is available, the merchant uses the 
customer’s billing address, obtained during the transaction.99  Finally, 
if none of the above options is available, the merchant uses the origin 
of shipping, which is typically the merchant’s location.100 
Once a “source” state is determined, the merchant charges the 
consumer that state’s tax rate.101  The merchant’s software is 
programmed to implement the five-step procedure and instruct the 
merchant to collect the appropriate level of tax.102 
As a further reflection of the uncertainty of state power to tax 
interstate Internet sales, the STP also offers merchants an 
opportunity to gain amnesty for all past tax collection activity.  
                                                          
 93. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967) 
(noting the “virtual welter of complicated obligations” that state taxation may impose 
on foreign merchants); North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 215 (N.D. 
1991) (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess and considering the potential burden of complex tax 
obligations on foreign merchants); see also supra Part II.A (explaining the significance 
of these cases with regard to the power of states to tax interstate transactions). 
 94. See MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK, supra note 85, at 20-21 
(explaining the origin of the STP). 
 95. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX 
PROJECT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 83, at 2-3. 
 96. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement § 310(A)(1), available at 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/SSUTA_Amended041806.pdf (last visited Oct. 
30, 2006).  
 97. Id. § 310 (A)(2). 
 98. Id. § 310 (A)(3). 
 99. Id. § 310 (A)(4). 
 100. Id. § 310 (A)(5). 
 101. Anthony D. Milewski, Jr., Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement:  Is Your 
Business Ready for Compliance?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 7 (Oct. 24, 2005) (citing 
Forest Lewis & Curtis Ruppal, Streamlined Sales/Use Tax Biggest Change in 70 Years, 
MICH. FORWARD 16 (Sept./Oct. 2004)). 
 102. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX 
PROJECT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 83, at 2-3. 
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Amnesty is available in exchange for merchants adopting and 
implementing the STP software within twelve months of either:  
(1) the software becoming available; or (2) the applicable state 
joining the STP.103  Some retailers have already taken advantage of 
the amnesty offer and are implementing STP systems.104 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STREAMLINED SALES TAX PROJECT 
Any potential challenge by a foreign merchant reluctant to collect 
use taxes under the STP of a foreign state would have to assert that 
the STP is unconstitutional.105  Thus, a plaintiff would have to 
demonstrate that the STP, as enforced, violated the Due Process 
Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the general structure of governance 
articulated in the Constitution. 
Given the careful planning by the MTC, it would not be surprising 
if courts were to uphold the STP as constitutional.  Practically 
speaking, the STP provides more certainty for merchants facing 
potential lawsuits, and allows the state revenues to grow with the 
economy.  This Part shows, however, that this practical advantage is 
gained at the expense of deviating from established structures of 
governance. As discussed below, a challenge to the STP on due 
process grounds is not likely to succeed because the changing due 
process standards embraced by the Supreme Court have adapted to 
the interstate nature of the nation’s commercial activities.106  
However, the Court is much more likely to accept a challenge to the 
STP as a violation of the Commerce Clause.  Commerce Clause 
                                                          
 103. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, § 402(A)(1). 
 104. Krebs, supra note 82. 
 105. A foreign merchant cannot challenge the STP as a violation of a federal 
statute because Congress has not passed a law that directly governs the legality of the 
STP.  See S. 152 CONG. REC. S14191 (Dec. 20, 2005) (proposing to approve the STP 
through Congress’ Commerce Clause authority).  It is also unlikely that a foreign 
merchant could challenge the STP as a violation of a state constitution, not only 
because these documents are not designed to govern interstate law, but also because 
state constitutions tend to grant the broadest possible state legislative authority.  See, 
e.g., CA. CONST. art. IV §§ 1, 8(c)(3) (decreeing that “[t]he legislative power of this 
State is vested in the California legislature,” and further implying that the legislature 
is authorized to levy taxes by stating that “statutes providing for tax levies . . . for the 
usual current expense of the state . . . shall go into effect immediately upon their 
enactment”); ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 1 (declaring that the state legislature “shall 
have full power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for the 
defense and benefit of the people of this State, not repugnant to this Constitution, 
nor to that of the United States”).  Finally, a foreign merchant cannot challenge the 
STP on the basis that it violates state law because state legislatures have replaced 
former taxing regimes with the STP.  See Press Release, The Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project, supra note 91 (stating that all participating states had passed identical tax 
regulations). 
 106. See infra Part III.A (discussing the modern changes in due process case law). 
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jurisprudence has vacillated over time and has thus not provided 
clear guidance to states or foreign merchants as to when states may 
tax transactions of an interstate nature.107  Finally, the Court may also 
be more likely to embrace a challenge to the STP on grounds that it 
is contrary to the federalist structure enunciated by the Constitution, 
as the STP allows the states to collectively encroach on federal 
power.108 
A. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause 
The STP will likely survive a due process challenge, given the 
Court’s broad approach to multiple jurisdiction disputes.109  It is well 
established that a state has not violated a citizen’s due process rights 
when that citizen has “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits 
and privileges of conducting business within the state because such 
purposeful action constitutes the minimum contact necessary for the 
state to obtain personal jurisdiction over that citizen.110  Indeed, the 
Court has directly applied this standard to assess a firm’s minimum 
contacts with a state in the context of catalog sales.111 
While the Court has never ruled that catalog sales are analogous to 
Internet transactions, lower courts have begun to implicitly make that 
logical assumption.  In Mink v. AAAA Development, Inc.,112 for example, 
the Fifth Circuit identified a three-tiered classification of Internet 
activity for assessing a foreign firm’s contacts with the forum state.113  
The court found that when a “defendant clearly does business over the 
Internet by entering into contracts with residents of other states . . . 
personal jurisdiction [over him] is proper.”114  The court classified a 
                                                          
 107. See infra Part III.B (deciphering applicable commerce clause jurisprudence). 
 108. See infra Part III.C (analyzing the appropriate balance of power between state 
and federal government). 
 109. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the constitutional interplay of the Commerce 
Clause and the Due Process Clause in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding interstate 
sales taxes). 
 110. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (finding that a 
franchisee had “purposefully availed” itself of the Florida forum where the franchisee 
conducted business with a Florida franchisor and agreed to a contractual forum 
selection clause). 
 111. See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (upholding the Court’s 
pronouncement in Burger King that a firm need not be physically present in a state to 
be subject to its judicial enforcement; the firm need merely interact intentionally 
with the forum). 
 112. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 113. See id. at 336-37 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)) (applying the principles of Zippo to AAAA to find that 
the firm’s website, which allowed users to download an order form, but not directly 
to place an order, did not constitute grounds upon which AAAA was subject to 
personal jurisdiction). 
 114. Id. at 336 (emphasis added) (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124). 
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second tier of websites, “[i]n the middle of the spectrum” of contacts 
with the forum, where a firm operated a “website that allows a user to 
exchange information with a host computer.”115  In the last tier, in which 
personal jurisdiction is unlikely, the “defendant merely established a 
passive website that does nothing more than advertise on the 
website.”116  Thus, to the extent that contracts formed on the basis of 
a catalog solicitation have been replaced by similar transactions on 
the Internet, they are nonetheless intentional business transactions 
that satisfy a minimum contacts analysis.117  Certainly, like a sale from 
a catalog, an Internet sale is more than a mere exchange of 
information; it is an example of a merchant clearly conducting 
business.118 
Other circuits have not embraced the three-tiered classification of 
Internet activity, but have nonetheless held that any firm that 
willingly establishes and maintains a website open to commercial 
transactions has satisfied the purposeful minimum contacts 
requirements of personal jurisdiction.119  In fact, some courts have 
considered the vast potential of direct Internet sales as a factor 
weighing towards declaring firms using the technology subject to 
general jurisdiction.120  Based on federal courts’ growing acceptance 
                                                          
 115. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 
1328 (E.D. Mo. (1996)). 
 116. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 117. See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (finding that catalog sales 
made “in continuous and widespread solicitation of business” within a state satisfied 
the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 
at 1126 (employing a minimum contacts test to assert personal jurisdiction over a 
website company that had 3,000 subscribers and seven contracts with Internet service 
providers within the forum state). 
 118. Compare Mink, 190 F.3d at 336 (finding a court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over a website that did not transact business, only posted information, over the 
Internet), with Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126 (finding personal jurisdiction over website 
that entered sales contracts with state citizens over the Internet). 
 119. E.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(applying a so-called “sliding scale” for Internet based firms:  when firms clearly 
conduct business over the Internet, if the transactions are “continuous and 
systematic,” then personal jurisdiction is appropriate); cf.  Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 
467, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing the important difference between cases involving 
commercial transactions, such as Zippo and Mink, and cases scrutinizing non-
commercial websites, where “visitor[s] may participate in an open forum hosted by 
[a] website,” and concluding that such non-commercial cases, such as defamation 
cases, should follow the guidelines articulated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 
(1984)); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(declaring that a state has personal jurisdiction over any firm operating a website 
“specifically intended [to] interact[] with residents of the state”). 
 120. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (insinuating that regular and substantial Internet sales may serve as 
grounds for finding the existence of general jurisdiction, but finding that 
maintaining a passive website falls far short of the contacts necessary to approximate 
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of personal jurisdiction over firms with well-established Internet sites 
engaged in commercial activity, it is unlikely that a foreign merchant 
could successfully challenge the STP on due process grounds.121 
B. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project Likely Violates the Commerce Clause 
If a foreign merchant challenged the STP on Commerce Clause 
grounds, courts likely would be more receptive.  Quite distinct from 
due process concerns, Commerce Clause challenges to state taxation 
have left considerable confusion in the judiciary.122  In part, this 
confusion appears to stem from exactly which types of state actions 
the Commerce Clause prohibits.  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s 
attitude of how restricted the states are by the Commerce Clause has 
historically tended to sway along with its approach to libertarian 
ideals.123  In reality, much of the confusion can be explained by the 
fact that in earlier decisions, the Court often, but not always, 
embraced a stricter interpretation of the Commerce Clause, often 
                                                          
physical presence).  But see Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (citing Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI 
Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing the contention that 
even a frequently visited website could constitute grounds for general jurisdiction 
because “while [the foreign firm] may be doing business with Texas, it is not doing 
business in Texas”); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 2002) (ruling that 
Ohio courts lacked general jurisdiction over a non-resident business that registered 
Internet domain names despite the fact that:  (1) the defendant maintained a 
website open for commercial transactions with Ohio residents; and (2) over 4,000 
Ohio residents had, in fact, registered domain names by using the defendant’s 
website, while noting that Ohio did have personal jurisdiction over the firm). 
 121. But see Quill, 504 U.S. at 319-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (stressing 
the distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction, though 
admitting that the Court has never fully enunciated these differences). 
 122. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-12 (explaining that the North Dakota Supreme 
Court had confused a Commerce Clause inquiry with a Due Process Clause inquiry); 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274-75 (1977) (bemoaning that 
the “perennial problem of the validity of a state tax [under the Commerce Clause]” 
has long been a “troublesome area” for the courts) (internal quotation omitted). 
 123. Compare Specter Motor Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1952) 
(stating that strictly interstate transactions, as opposed to those involving local 
business, could not be taxed by the states), Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 276 
(1946) (suggesting that the purpose of the Commerce Clause was to promote free 
trade among the states, and that allowing states to tax these transactions was contrary 
to this purpose), and Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 447-48 (1827) (declaring that 
the power to tax intercourse among the states resided solely in the realm of 
Congress), with D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988) (holding that 
firms engaged in interstate commerce must pay their “fair share” of the state tax 
burden), Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 1084 (disavowing the formalistic approach of 
deciding which interstate transaction taxes were unconstitutional based on the 
language of the taxing statute), and Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 
U.S. 250, 256-59 (1933) (implying that state taxation of interstate commerce was 
illegitimate only in cases where foreign merchants experienced disparate tax 
treatment as compared to in-state merchants). 
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termed the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause.124  The 
dormant Commerce Clause barred states from taxing interstate 
commerce, regardless of the will of Congress, if that taxation 
significantly harmed the national interest.125  The Court itself has 
admitted that the strength of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
however, has vacillated during the Court’s history.126 
1. A Commerce Clause analysis is governed by the Complete Auto standards 
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court generally 
uses the Commerce Clause only to strike down taxes violating one or 
more of the four prongs it enunciated in Complete Auto, eschewing a 
strict dormant Commerce Clause interpretation.127  In Complete Auto, 
the Court clarified that state taxation of interstate commerce was 
constitutional when the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly 
related to the services provided by the [s]tate.”128  In applying the 
Complete Auto test, the Court claims to continue the Framers’ vision of 
preventing the states from sapping the strength of interstate 
commerce for the sake of narrow interests.129  Thus, the Court 
purports to satisfy the goals underlying the dormant interpretation of 
                                                          
 124. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 179-81 (1995) 
(confirming the Court’s adherence to the dormant Commerce Clause, noting its 
purpose as a method for protecting interstate commerce, and discussing the “turns” 
in the Court’s approach to the doctrine over the years). 
 125. Id. at 179-80 (explaining that, under this interpretation, the intent of the 
Framers was to avoid “economic Balkanization” initiated by state interests “that had 
plagued relations among the Colonies”). 
 126. Id. at 180 (bemoaning that “the Court’s understanding of the dormant 
Commerce Clause has taken some turns”).  See generally id. at 179-84 (summarizing 
the jurisprudence of the dormant Commerce Clause and concluding that the Court 
had abandoned the “formalism” of the dormant Commerce Clause by 1977, when it 
issued the Complete Auto decision). 
 127. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-11; see, e.g., Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184 (identifying 
the central controversy in the case as satisfaction of Complete Auto’s second prong—
fair apportionment of the tax); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989) 
(exploring the “wavering doctrinal lines” prior to Complete Auto’s four-part test). 
 128. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. 
 129. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 180 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James 
Madison) and THE FEDERALIST NOS. 7 & 11 (Alexander Hamilton) as indications of 
the Framers’ concern for the stability of national commerce, deemed a necessary 
ingredient for national political health); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 80 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (“I am willing here to allow, in its 
full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States 
should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own 
revenues for the supply of their own wants.  And making this concession, I affirm that 
(with the sole exception of [state] duties on imports and exports) [the individual States] 
would . . . retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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the Commerce Clause without narrowly constricting states’ ability to 
raise revenue.130 
2. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project fails the substantial nexus requirement 
of the Complete Auto test 
Confusion notwithstanding, if the Court were to apply the Complete 
Auto four-prong test to the STP, it could very well find the STP 
unconstitutional.  The most controversial aspect of the STP is its 
relation to the first prong of Complete Auto, where the Court would 
examine whether the foreign merchant maintained a “substantial 
nexus” within the taxing state.131  Given that the Court has not 
defined this phrase, scholars have noted that any attempt to discuss 
the phrase on its own is a frustrating exercise.132  Additionally, the 
Court has habitually used the phrase without providing a full context 
for its historical use.  For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Jefferson Lines,133 the Court proclaimed that “[i]t has long been settled 
that a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in 
which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction 
taxable by that State.”134  Yet this broad pronouncement was made 
without reference to the Court’s own long-standing “safe harbor” 
principle, which exempted foreign firms that sold tangible goods to 
state residents solely through a common carrier.135  The Jefferson Lines 
opinion also failed to mention that a very small quantity of goods 
might not qualify as a substantial nexus either, as was the case for 
several computer disks in the 1992 Quill decision.136 
                                                          
 130. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 303-04 (explaining that the Complete Auto decision was a 
direct rejection of the contention that any taxation of interstate commerce by the 
states was unconstitutional); Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 179-80 (insisting that while not 
all attempts by states to tax interstate commerce without congressional authorization 
are unconstitutional, the Court has “consistently held [that the] language [of the 
Commerce Clause] contain[s] a further, negative command, known as the dormant 
Commerce Clause,” though the Court has not strictly interpreted the clause). 
 131. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-12 (disputing the finding of the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota that the “substantial nexus” requirement under Complete Auto’s 
contemplation of the Commerce Clause is equivalent to the “minimum contacts” 
inquiry of the Due Process Clause, though admitting that confusion is 
understandable). 
 132. See Baez, supra note 75, at 597 (admitting that “it is useless to try to discern 
any substantive meaning from the phrases ‘substantial nexus,’ ‘sufficient nexus,’ or 
‘nexus aplenty’ themselves”). 
 133. 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
 134. Id. at 184 (internal citation omitted). 
 135. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 
386 U.S. 753 (1967)). 
 136. Id. at 315 n.8 (citing Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 
U.S. 551, 556 (1977), to explain that there is an artificial threshold below which the 
court would ignore physical incursions by a foreign firm into a state). 
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However, there are several theories about what may constitute a 
substantial nexus, based on both case law and congressional 
intervention:  the representational nexus theory; the strict or 
modified physical nexus theory; and the congressionally authorized 
nexus theory.137  A review of each theory reveals that a foreign 
merchant selling through the Internet does not have a substantial 
nexus with a foreign state. 
First, the representational nexus theory argues that strictly 
Internet-based retailers have a representational presence in the 
taxing state via the Internet service providers or other online services 
that consumers within the taxing state use to access the website.138  
For example, if a citizen of Ohio used a local service provider, such as 
a cable company, to access the Internet and complete a purchase 
from a website owned by a merchant whose only physical presence 
was in Maine, then the service provider acted as a conduit, physically 
linking the Maine merchant to the Ohio purchase.  This theory is not 
without merit.  In the past, the Court has held that certain 
representatives of a firm who were present within a state constituted a 
substantial nexus, satisfying the first prong of the Complete Auto test.139  
For example, in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of 
Revenue,140 the Supreme Court found that a firm without offices or 
property in Washington, but that nonetheless had sales 
representatives (who were not employees) within Washington, 
maintained a substantial nexus with the state.141  Therefore, the Court 
held that subjecting the foreign merchant to business and occupation 
taxes was constitutional.142  The Court rationalized that the act of 
                                                          
 137. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text (demonstrating the 
unlikelihood that Congress would give states authorization to tax Internet sales).  See 
generally Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation:  State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales, 24 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 617-28 (1997) (defining and dismissing the possible 
arguments for states to assert a substantial nexus claim over e-commerce providers 
without physical operations in a state). 
 138. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 619-20 (discussing the history of the 
representational nexus theory and the possibility of its application to taxation over 
Internet sales). 
 139. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (stating 
that state taxation is valid if, among other requirements, the “tax is applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State”). 
 140. 483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
 141. See id. at 249-50 (noting that Tyler Pipe’s sales representatives, on Tyler Pipe’s 
behalf, cultivated goodwill and positive customer relations in Washington’s highly 
competitive market by routinely calling customers and soliciting orders). 
 142. Id. at 251 (agreeing with the Washington Supreme Court that a substantial 
nexus existed because company sales representatives were responsible for 
maintaining and protecting Tyler Pipe’s market interests in the state); see also Ashraf, 
supra note 137, at 620 n.125 (acknowledging that a business and occupation tax is 
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soliciting business within a state was certainly a substantial portion of 
commerce, contributing to the firm’s well-being; such acts could thus 
be taxed by a state.143 
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson144 presented a similar situation, where a 
foreign firm without any physical assets in Florida hired ten 
independent contractors to solicit orders in the state.145  The Court 
found that Florida’s use tax applied to the firm because the 
intentional actions of the independent contractors and the firm’s 
continuous solicitation of business from the state constituted 
sufficient commercial activity to constitute a substantial nexus with 
Florida.146  Some scholars have argued that, under these precedents, 
Internet service providers perform the identical function of the 
independent salesmen by regularly and continuously soliciting orders 
from within each state, thus constituting a substantial nexus.147 
However, Congress has rejected the representational nexus theory 
as applied to Internet sales.  Since October of 1998, The Internet Tax 
Freedom Act has prohibited states from claiming that a foreign, 
Internet-based firm maintains a substantial nexus with the state 
“solely as a result of . . . processing of orders through the out-of-State 
computer server of a provider of Internet access service or online 
services.”148  Since Congress has the explicit constitutional power to 
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”149 the Internet 
Tax Freedom Act has invalidated the representational nexus theory 
as applied to Internet retailers.150 
Second, states may argue that a modified physical nexus 
requirement for Internet retailers constitutes a substantial nexus on 
which to base a use tax.151  This argument posits that the in-state 
                                                          
not identical to a use tax, but that the definition of substantial nexus used by the 
Court may well be the same, as applied to these taxes). 
 143. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249-50 (paying particular attention to the fact that 
Tyler Pipe received virtually all of its market information from its in-state sales 
representatives). 
 144. 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 145. Id. at 209. 
 146. Id. at 211 (dismissing the distinction between full-time employees and 
independent contractors as constitutionally insignificant for the purposes of a 
substantial nexus analysis). 
 147. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 621-27 (considering, and then rejecting, three 
separate arguments defining internet service providers as representatives of the firm 
because these providers behave more like advertisers than active solicitors). 
 148. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax 
Freedom Act, § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II)). 
 149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 150. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II). 
 151. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 627-28 (clarifying that a modified physical nexus 
requirement would equate the virtual presence of the Internet with the physical 
presence required under a traditional substantial nexus analysis). 
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physical requirement of a firm’s assets or representatives is based on 
an outdated understanding of commerce.152  Just as the notion of 
fairness inherent in the courts’ approach to personal jurisdiction had 
included the now-discarded requirement that one must have either 
property or be present within the state,153 some argue that the 
Commerce Clause definition of fairness should likewise be updated.154  
This position contains two major flaws.  First, the substantial nexus 
requirement has never been associated strictly with fairness to the 
litigating parties.155  Indeed, the substantial nexus requirement is just 
one of four requirements instituted by Complete Auto to assure fair 
taxation on foreign firms; requirements two, three, and four already 
incorporate such fairness considerations.156  Thus, fairness need not 
be considered within the definition of substantial nexus.157  Second, 
Congress has clearly repudiated changing the definition of physical 
presence as it applies to Internet retailers.  The Internet Tax 
Freedom Act specifically prohibits states from asserting a nexus claim 
“solely as a result of (I) the display of a remote seller’s information of 
content on the out-of-State computer server” or “(II) the processing 
                                                          
 152. See generally id. at 627-28 (theorizing that the Court could not have predicted 
the growth of non-physical, Internet-based transactions as a component of interstate 
commerce when it decided Quill in 1992); MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM 
AT RISK, supra note 85, at 9-13 (attributing a greater reduction in state and local 
revenues versus the national economy during the post- September 11, 2001 period 
partly to a shift in the avenues of consumer transactions); Eric A. Ess, Comment, 
Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation?:  States Seek Solution to Stop E-Commerce 
Sale Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 893, 917 (2006) (citing John E. Sununu, The 
Taxation of Internet Commerce, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325, 334 (2002)) (likening the 
updating of taxation laws to conform to technology to the transformation of other 
laws, such as wiretapping statutes, which were updated to accommodate changes in 
communications technology). 
 153. See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining the holding of Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 96 U.S. 714 (1878)). 
 154. See, e.g., Baez, supra note 75, at 607-08 (interpreting the court’s Commerce 
Clause analysis in Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1996) as 
centered on the fairness of taxing the defendant); see also Ashraf, supra note 137, at 
627-28 (discussing the suggested use of a modified, or virtual, physical nexus 
requirement). 
 155. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (explaining that 
fairness to the litigating parties is a concern more aptly included in a Due Process 
determination, not a Commerce Clause analysis, which is primarily concerned with 
balancing state and federal interests); Tax Comm’r of W.Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. 
04-AA-157, 2006 WL 3455005 (W. Va. 2006) (agreeing that the purpose of Quill was 
to provide businesses with a clear guideline:  businesses without a physical presence 
in a state had no substantial nexus with the state). 
 156. See supra note 56 (describing the four prongs of the Complete Auto test). In 
particular, note that prong two specifically asks whether a tax “is fairly apportioned.”  
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 157. See Baez, supra note 75, at 608 (lamenting that even though fairness should 
only come into play in a Due Process Clause analysis, federal courts continue to 
erroneously consider fairness in their Commerce Clause analysis). 
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of orders through [an] out-of-State computer server.”158  Clearly, 
through this language, Congress has exercised its power over 
interstate commerce to prevent states from expanding the definition 
of physical sales.  Given the Court’s concession that Congress should 
be granted the ultimate authority to apply the Commerce Clause,159 
the chances of a federal court expanding the definition of physical 
sales to Internet sales are remote. 
Third, the states may succeed in applying the substantial nexus 
requirements to Internet sales through congressional definitions or 
action.  Given current legislation, however, it appears unlikely that a 
court would find a substantial nexus for an Internet-based foreign 
merchant, barring some new congressional action.160  The Court is 
not interpreting a blank slate; Congress has demonstrated an interest 
in the issue of states levying Internet sales taxes.161  Congress has also 
demonstrated an interest in the issue of states levying income taxes 
on businesses engaged in interstate commerce.162  In two directly 
related laws concerning state taxation authority, Congress has acted 
to limit state power.163  In fact, Congress has instituted fifty-seven laws 
that attempt to preempt traditional state powers, showing that 
Congress is generally hostile to the accumulation of state power.164  
                                                          
 158. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax 
Freedom Act § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II)). 
 159. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (“Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and 
to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to 
collect use taxes.”) (emphasis added). 
 160. See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement:  States’ Efforts to Facilitate Sales Tax 
Collection From Remote Vendors, supra note 50, at 1-2 (opening statement of Rep. Chris 
Cannon, Chairman) (warning that “[t]he [STP] marks a significant departure from 
the [state] sales and use tax system now in place in the United States” and noting 
that Congress will “first address . . . the concepts contained in the [STP] before 
considering legislative action”). 
 161. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax 
Freedom Act §§ 1100-1104) (prohibiting certain state taxes on Internet access 
services). 
 162. See Interstate Income Tax Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391 (2000) (limiting the 
states’ ability to levy income taxes resulting from the sales derived by individuals or 
businesses without a physical presence in the taxing state, but who ship orders to that 
state). 
 163. See id. § 381(a) (decreeing, in a bill passed in 1959, that “[n]o State, or 
political subdivision thereof, shall have the power to impose . . . a net income tax on 
the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce” if the 
person or business earning the income has no physical presence within the state); 47 
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)(Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax Freedom Act, 
§§ 1101-1104) (prohibiting states from levying taxes on Internet access services, 
collecting Internet-only taxes, such as taxes on emails or bandwidth, and instituting 
multiple taxation of e-commerce).   
 164. See MINORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, CONGRESSIONAL 
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 1 (June 2006), available at 
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20060606095331-23055.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (deeming usurping state authority to be necessary, even 
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Thus, given that Congress has never authorized the states to 
implement a tax scheme that broadly affects interstate commerce in 
the manner employed by the STP, states should not be able to assert 
a substantial nexus over foreign Internet retailers without new 
congressional authorization.165 
3. A failure to comply with the Complete Auto substantial nexus test      
violates the Commerce Clause 
Thus, while the Court no longer automatically applies a strict 
dormant Commerce Clause approach to state taxation cases,166 it may 
nonetheless find the STP unconstitutional.  Both recent case law and 
congressional action show that a reasonable interpretation of Complete 
Auto’s first requirement—that a foreign merchant maintain a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state—does not include Internet 
transactions.167  The above review of the representational nexus, strict 
physical nexus, and congressionally authorized theories of what may 
constitute a substantial nexus reveals that none appears to satisfy the 
substantial nexus requirement for the STP.168 
Note that the four prongs of the Complete Auto test are four separate 
requirements imposed on state taxes in interstate commerce; they are 
not factors to be weighed by the judiciary.169  Indeed, lower courts 
                                                          
though such preemption was intrusive and “[l]iterally hundreds of state laws . . . 
would be overridden”); see also MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK, 
supra note 85, at 28-29 (outlining the ten major characteristics of the intentional 
accumulation of federal power, at the expense of the states, that has occurred since 
the 1960s). 
 165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate 
commerce among the states); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) 
(quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637 (1981) (White, 
J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from 
intolerable or even undesirable burdens.”). 
 166. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
historical and present approaches to the dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause). 
 167. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax 
Freedom Act § 1101(a)) (explicitly prohibiting taxes on Internet access and 
electronic commerce, barring certain exceptions). 
 168. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 628-29 (concluding that until Congress passes 
legislation that expressly allows state to employ use taxes on electronic interstate 
commerce, Internet sales taxes cannot meet the substantial nexus requirement). 
 169. See Barclays Bank, Plc v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1994) 
(“Absent congressional approval, however, a state tax on [interstate] commerce will 
not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax 
(1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not 
fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly 
related to the services provided by the State”) (citation omitted); Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (decreeing that state taxation was 
valid when the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the 
taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the state”) (emphasis 
added). 
EVANS.OFFTOPRINTER 1/9/2007  1:12:23 PM 
448 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2 
have invalidated state taxes that they deem to violate just one of the 
four Complete Auto prongs.170  Thus, a state argument that the Court 
should weigh the contention that the STP actually improves the 
prospects for fair apportionment of taxes (the second prong of 
Complete Auto), or lessens discrimination against interstate commerce 
(the third prong) are not relevant.  Once a court finds that a foreign 
merchant lacks a substantial nexus with the taxing state (a first prong 
violation), as demonstrated above for the STP, then a court must find 
the tax in violation of the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the MTC 
cannot force foreign merchants using the Internet to comply with the 
STP. 
C. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project Is Contrary to the Federalist Structure of 
the Constitution 
For these reasons, it is entirely plausible that courts would embrace 
a foreign merchant’s challenge of the STP under the Commerce 
Clause, asserting that the states lack a substantial nexus over a 
merchant without physical assets within some or all of the states 
enforcing the STP.  If that argument fails, however, the foreign 
merchant could also resort to a structural argument under the 
Commerce Clause.171  Thus far, challenges to the power of state 
taxation have been leveled against individual states.172  For more than 
a decade, these individual state efforts to collect use taxes from 
foreign merchants were required by courts to comply with the Quill 
standards.173  The STP laws, however, are significantly different from 
                                                          
 170. See, e.g., Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743-46 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that an Ohio tax, whose satisfaction of only the second prong of the 
Complete Auto test was in dispute, violated the Commerce Clause); Barringer v. 
Griffes, 1 F.3d 1331, 1335-39 (2d Cir. 1993) (declaring a Vermont tax 
unconstitutional and refusing to examine the third prong of Complete Auto where the 
parties agreed that the first and fourth prongs of Complete Auto were satisfied, and the 
court found that the tax violated the second prong of Complete Auto). 
 171. See Fagan, supra note 90, at 466 (citing Jason L. Riley, Keep the Tax Man Off 
Line, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1999, at A14) (claiming that the states’ efforts to tax online 
sales of foreign merchants “has pitted the states against the federal government”). 
 172. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (dismissing a firm’s 
challenge of Ohio’s policy of exempting in-state, regulated natural gas vendors from 
sales tax when it ruled that the state’s regulation did not violate the Commerce 
Clause); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 199-200 (1995) (finding 
an Oklahoma tax on bus tickets for interstate travel consistent with the Commerce 
Clause); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (determining that a 
state, such as North Dakota, could only force merchants to collect use taxes when the 
firm willingly established a relationship with citizens of that specific state); Nat’l 
Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (ruling that Illinois could 
not force an out-of-state mail order company that engaged in no local advertising to 
collect use taxes and remit them to the state). 
 173. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. 
1996) (answering the district court’s inquiry by confirming that it was appropriate 
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the state laws examined in recent cases because these new STP laws 
represent collective state action.174  Thus, the Quill standards may no 
longer be the courts’ most pressing concern when assessing the STP. 
Instead, this collective state action broadly affects not only 
interstate commerce, but also the balance of federal and state power.  
Courts should find the STP unconstitutional not only because it may 
fail to comport with the Commerce Clause by violating the Quill 
standards, as discussed above, but also because the STP is contrary to 
the design of the Constitution.  In particular, the STP’s foundation of 
broad state power, articulated in the Tenth Amendment,175 is 
subservient to Congress’s narrow and explicit power to dictate the 
laws affecting interstate commerce.176 
The ubiquity of these state laws—forty-four states have passed laws 
under the STP177—presents a majoritarian concern:  if the people 
truly desired these laws, then their congressional representatives 
would pass them.178  On the contrary, a resolution supporting the STP 
has been introduced in Congress (after the STP was supposedly in 
effect), but has not left committee.179  Indeed, in 2003, the House of 
Representatives held a hearing to consider the validity of the STP, 
                                                          
and accurate to read Quill as standing for the proposition that any activity by a 
business in a state other than strict mail order sales satisfies the substantial nexus 
requirement); Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ill. 1996) 
(citing Quill as “[t]he most significant recent Supreme Court opinion” discussing the 
requirement that a business must maintain a substantial nexus with a state to be 
subjected to its taxation laws). 
 174. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (highlighting the collective 
nature of the state action under the STP and the joint formation of the STP’s rules); 
see also supra note 160 (showing that the new legal strategy of states under the STP 
has been flagged and discussed by Congress). 
 175. U.S. CONST. amend. X (proclaiming that any “powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States”). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3 (declaring that “Congress shall have power 
to . . . regulate commerce . . . among the several states”). 
 177. See Press Release, The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, supra note 91 
(advocating the states’ interests in creating a tax system that, according to the local 
governments, simplifies tax procedures and reduces burdens on state business 
communities). 
 178. But cf. League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2595, 2614-16 (2006) 
(cautioning that if the criteria of Thornburg v. Gringles, 468 U.S. 30, 78-79 (1986), 
are met, then a congressional districting plan might be unconstitutional with respect 
to minority voting rights).  More importantly, note that implicit in the League of Latin 
Am. Citizens decision is the premise that, as a general matter, it is entirely 
constitutional for congressional districts to be gerrymandered by the state, and thus, 
Congress may not represent the true will of the people.  Then again, if it is the state 
legislature that has the power to influence political success for federal legislators, it is 
actually more puzzling why Congress has not endorsed the STP. 
 179. S. 152 CONG. REC. S14191 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
EVANS.OFFTOPRINTER 1/9/2007  1:12:23 PM 
450 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2 
although it did not endorse it.180  One could certainly construe this 
lack of action as tacit refusal by Congress to endorse the STP.181 
Just as the Court has analyzed the structure of the Constitution to 
limit federal executive power, it likely would examine the federalist 
roots of the Constitution to limit state power.  The Supreme Court 
has found that the nation’s executive, which has broad constitutional 
authority,182 is most constricted when it acts pursuant to a power that 
has been specifically granted to Congress, and Congress has not 
delegated that power to the President.183  Analogously, a state’s broad 
authority to govern should likewise be narrowly construed in arenas 
in which specific authority is constitutionally delegated to Congress.184 
While this argument embraces the Court’s tendency to maintain a 
separation of powers among the three branches of the federal 
government, the same underlying principle holds for the separation 
between state and federal power.185  Just as the powers of the 
                                                          
 180. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement:  States’ Efforts to Facilitate Sales Tax 
Collection From Remote Vendors:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 148 (2003).  
 181. But see New Economy Tax Fairness Act, S. 664, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(proposing, essentially, to endorse the Quill decision, and explicitly stating that a 
state citizen’s mere use of Internet technologies to buy goods from foreign firms 
does not create a substantial nexus with a state, thereby repudiating the STP).  
However, like the resolution in support of the STP, this bill has not passed.  See supra 
note 179 and accompanying text (noting the stalled resolution in support of the 
STP).   
 182. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581-82 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981), for the proposition that 
courts need not scrutinize cases in which the executive has been granted power 
through broadly worded constitutional or legislative language); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(characterizing executive power granted to the president by the Constitution as 
“comprehensive and undefined”). 
 183. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800-01 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part) (finding that the President did not have broad authority in the 
field of military justice because Congress had consistently passed rules regulating the 
subject); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (“When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at 
its lowest ebb.”). 
 184. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (establishing the supremacy of the federal 
government regarding powers that are specifically delegated to the United States, but 
reserving other unnamed powers to the several States); supra notes 182-183 
(describing the limitations of the President’s powers, particularly in areas where 
Congress has expressly exercised its own power). 
 185. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 255 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) 
(advocating an “interior structure of the [federal] government, as that its several 
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other 
in their proper places”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 280 (James Madison) (J.R. 
Pole ed., 2005) (“The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents 
and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different 
purposes.”) (emphasis added). 
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President are broadly painted,186 the powers of the states are broadly 
articulated in the Constitution, which states that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States.”187  Neither presidential nor 
state powers can include authority that the Constitution explicitly 
delegates to Congress.188  Just as the Court must guard against the 
unauthorized concentration of power in the hands of the executive, 
an explicit assurance of congressional authority should also be a 
protection against the tyranny of concentrated power of the state 
governments.189 
In this case, the Constitution clearly delegates the power to 
regulate interstate commerce to Congress, not to the states.190  While 
it is safe to say that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the 
power to regulate all aspects of citizens’ interaction in this nation,191 
the Supreme Court has certainly allowed Congress to regulate all 
manner of business transactions that cross state lines.192  The STP, by 
its nature, goes against the spirit of the principles of federalism,193 as 
                                                          
 186. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (stating that “[t]he executive power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America,” though not explicitly defining 
executive power); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (characterizing executive power under the Constitution as 
“comprehensive and undefined”). 
 187. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 253 (James Madison) 
(J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (proclaiming that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined,” while the powers 
“which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite”). 
 188. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (listing in 
explicit detail the powers that the Constitution grants the President, Congress, and 
the States, and reiterating that these powers are separate unless otherwise lawfully 
delegated). 
 189. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (noting that the nation’s Framers 
were wary of the power of state legislators, and thus reserved power for a federal 
legislative check by specifying congressional authority).  But cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 
45, at 252 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (assuring the public that “[t]he 
State governments will have the advantage of the federal government, whether we 
compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other . . . 
[or in respect] to the powers respectively vested in them”). 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3. 
 191. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (maintaining that 
Congress may only assert its commerce clause authority over matters that involve 
interstate “economic activity”). 
 192. See id. (noting the constitutionality of congressional regulation of mining, 
restaurants, and credit-related transactions because these activities are economic in 
nature). 
 193. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 254 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“If 
the new Constitution [is] examined . . . it will be found that the change which it 
proposes [from the Articles of Confederation] consists much less in the addition of 
new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its original powers.  The 
regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which 
few oppose.”) (emphasis added).  Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (assuring citizens that “the State Governments would 
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well as the spirit of the Commerce Clause,194 as the states attempt to 
assert a power that has been granted to Congress, but never explicitly 
delegated to the states. 
That the STP muddies constitutionally delegated lines of authority 
should certainly outweigh the practical clarifications that the STP 
admittedly provides.  The consolidation of state taxation procedures 
under the STP does delineate a clear method for states to extract 
revenues from interstate sales while avoiding the risk of double 
taxation, a goal that the Court has embraced.195  Indeed, state 
advocates may argue that since the STP merely requests foreign 
merchants to implement one simple software program to facilitate 
taxation, the STP complies with the Court’s preference for 
“pragmatism” over “formalism” when assessing interstate 
transactions.196  Yet the STP’s fulfillment of the second of four prongs 
outlined in Complete Auto is insufficient to overcome the STP’s 
deficiencies.  First, as previously discussed, the satisfaction of one of 
Complete Auto’s four criteria cannot come at the expense of any of the 
other three.197  Second, the Court does not regard constitutional 
delineations of power as merely formal boundaries that it may ignore 
for the sake of simpler transactions.  In fact, the Court’s preference 
for simplicity over formalism extends only as far as the wording of tax 
statutes, certainly not to constitutional principles.198  Quite to the 
contrary, the Court approaches issues delineating constitutional roles 
                                                          
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not 
by [ratification of the Constitution] exclusively delegated to the United States”), with 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states.”), and U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states”) (emphasis added). 
 194. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (“The very purpose 
of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 195. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989) (stating that the primary 
purpose of Complete Auto’s second prong of fair apportionment “is to ensure that 
each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction”); W. Live Stock v. 
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 257 (1938) (praising state taxes levied on interstate 
sales where gross receipts are apportioned because “it is a practical way of laying 
upon the commerce its share of the local tax burden without subjecting [the 
transaction] to multiple taxation”). 
 196. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995) (citing 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)) (illustrating that the 
Court is less interested in parsing specific language of specific tax statutes and far 
more concerned over the practical effects the tax may have on merchants). 
 197. See supra Part III.B.3 (emphasizing that the four prongs of Complete Auto are 
not factors, but are each independently required by the Court to comply with the 
Commerce Clause). 
 198. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (contending that when considering state tax 
statutes under the Commerce Clause, courts should examine “not the formal 
language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect”) (emphasis added). 
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studiously, with frequent reference to The Federalist as a guide.199  
One therefore cannot ignore the argument that the STP appears to 
be not only incongruent with the plain language of the Constitution, 
but also contrary to the principles outlined in The Federalist.  Thus, 
barring congressional action, courts should also reject the STP as 
contrary to the federalist design of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
While the MTC clearly attempted to frame the STP in a manner 
acceptable under current constitutional jurisprudence, in order to 
allow the states to recover perceived “lost” revenue by coordinating 
with one another, there are at least two lines of reasoning available to 
declare the STP unconstitutional.  While the goals of the STP seem 
entirely reasonable, the STP operates in a legal gray area, where, in 
the absence of congressional approval, state regulation of interstate 
commerce might be constitutional, but has hardly been endorsed by 
Congress.  Shrewdly, the MTC included a risk-reward program within 
the STP, offering merchants the opportunity to comply with the 
regulations on a voluntary basis.  Thus, the MTC might avoid a legal 
challenge of the STP, should merchants find compliance cheaper 
than protest. 
Any online merchant without a true physical presence in a state 
can challenge the STP, as applied by that state.200  First, the foreign 
merchant can challenge a state’s claim that, under a current 
understanding of the Commerce Clause, the merchant maintains a 
substantial nexus with the state.  A merchant could dispel all three 
expansive notions of a substantial nexus by pointing to contrary 
congressional intent, in conjunction with current jurisprudence.  
                                                          
 199. See Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1324, 1329-30 (1998) (analyzing the frequency of citations to The Federalist in 
Court opinions and finding that opinions in the 1980s and 1990s cited this authority 
much more frequently than those in prior eras); James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred 
Text:  The Supreme Court’s Use of the Federalist Papers, 1985 BYU L. REV. 65, 68-73 (1985) 
(asserting that the increased citation to The Federalist by the Court has coincided 
with the rise of the assertion that understanding historical context is more important 
than interpreting the plain language of disputed law or clause).  
 200. By design, this Comment assumes that the foreign merchant would have 
standing to bring this suit.  Many challenges to the STP would also satisfy the 
ripeness requirement, since merchants must begin to implement the STP 
immediately, or risk legal action by the states.  See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 
296, 300 (1998) (stating that a claim cannot be ripe if it depends upon future, 
uncertain events before the dispute materializes).  It is entirely possible that a 
challenge to the STP might arise when a state prosecutes a foreign merchant 
pursuant to the STP.  Given the amount of money in controversy here, it would be 
surprising if no state or merchant entered into a legal dispute over the 
constitutionality of the STP within the next several years. 
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Second, the merchant can also claim that the STP should be struck 
down on the structural basis of the Constitution.  Under the STP, the 
states have collectively acted without the approval of Congress, and 
with Congress’ tacit disapproval, pursuant to the Commerce Clause—
an arena designated for congressional governance. 
Thus, despite the careful planning of the MTC, courts should find 
the STP unconstitutional. 
